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Mu'Mn v. Virginia: The Supreme Court's
Failure to Establish Adequate Judicial
Procedures to Counter the Prejudicial
Effects of Pretrial Publicity
I.

INTRODUCTION

On May 30, 1991, the United States Supreme Court decided
Mu'Min v. Virginia.' In this five-to-four decision, the Court held
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment2 does
not require prospective jurors to be screened regarding the specific
content of media exposure in voir dire examinations.3 Thus, in
cases accompanied by significant pretrial publicity, the Sixth
Amendment's impartial jury requirement' will be satisfied when
jurors do not admit during voir dire that they have been prejudiced
by pretrial publicity.
The issue before the Court in Mu'Min was one of first impression. Although the Court previously had dealt with the issue of
juror partiality due to pretrial publicity,5 it never before had ruled
on the extent of questioning required to uncover such partiality. In
holding that minimal voir dire questioning on the issue of pretrial
publicity satisfies due process, the Court in Mu'Min undermined its
prior decisions that recognized the adverse effects of pretrial publicity on juries. As a result, the procedural safeguards put in place
to protect criminal defendants from the adverse effects of pretrial
publicity now can be easily thwarted.
This Note begins with a discussion of the relevant case law leading up to Mu'Min and the facts of that case. It then analyzes the
majority opinion and points out the inadequacies of its reasoning.
In particular, this Note explains that the Court's holding in
Mu'Min severely restricts a criminal defendant's right to obtain an
impartial jury when considerable publicity accompanies the case.
1.
2.

111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991).
The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law....
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1908.
4. See infra note 6 (setting forth the text of the Sixth Amendment).
5. See infra notes 18-38 and accompanying text.
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This Note argues that the detrimental impact of Mu'Min can be
eradicated if state courts offer criminal defendants greater rights
under their state constitutions. Finally, this Note stresses that in
Illinois, independent state grounds exist to provide an adequate
level of protection to criminal defendants in order to compensate
for the inadequate rights afforded to them under Mu'Mn.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

The Voir Dire

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right
to a trial by an impartial jury.6 An impartial jury is one that determines the guilt or innocence of the defendant based only on the
evidence submitted at trial.7 Jurors must leave their preconceived
notions and prejudices outside of the jury box in order to provide
the criminal defendant with the fundamental guarantees of due
process. Of course, due process does not require that jurors be
completely ignorant of the facts and issues involved.' The Constitution mandates only that jurors decide the case based on the facts
presented during the trial. 9
One of the principle methods by which a defendant can assure
his right to an impartial jury is the voir dire. Through probing
questioning, the court and counsel attempt to eliminate any members of the venirepanel who harbor prejudicial attitudes. Voir dire
has two basic purposes: to allow the trial judge to identify any
potential jurors who should be challenged for cause;'" and to allow
6.

The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed....

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

7. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
8. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). "To hold that the mere existence of any
preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient
to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an
impossible standard." Id. at 723.
9. See Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462.
10. Generally, a party or court should challenge a potential juror for cause if it is
shown that the juror would be unable to lay aside his or her impressions or opinions and
render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented in court. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723.
Although the trial court can exercise an unlimited number of challenges for cause, a
removal for cause is only allowed in certain circumstances. See Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S.
430, 432-33 (1887). Typical reasons for being excused for cause are: being related to the
defendant or the victim; having previously been a juror in the same case that ended in
mistrial; or having formed an expressed and fixed opinion as to the defendant's guilt or
innocence. Id.
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counsel the opportunity to intelligently and effectively exercise peremptory challenges.' Generally, the trial judge has broad discretion in conducting voir dire. 2 Thus, a reviewing court will set
aside the trial court's determination of juror impartiality only upon
a showing of manifest error. 13
B.

Racial Bias

Even though the Supreme Court recognizes the broad discretion
of trial judges in conducting voir dire, it nonetheless requires inquiry in specific instances. 4 For example, the Court mandates examination of the venirepanel if requested by the defendant when a
11. Unlike the challenge for cause, peremptory challenges are limited in number and
can be exercised without a stated reason. Although peremptory challenges are not constitutionally guaranteed, the Supreme Court has recognized their importance in eliminating
bias from the jury box:
[T]he challenge is "one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused." ... [T]he very availability of peremptories allows counsel to ascertain
the possibility of bias through probing questions on the voir dire.... It is often
exercised upon the "sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are
apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another," upon a juror's
"habits and associations" or upon the feeling that the "bare questioning [a juror's] indifference may sometimes provoke a resentment."
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219, 220 (1965) (citations omitted), overruled in part by
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Until recently, impairment of the right to exercise peremptory challenges was held to be reversible error. Cf. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 81, 86 (1988) (holding that impairment of the right to a peremptory challenge violates the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury only if actual bias is shown).
12. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189 (1981). The Rosales Court
observed that "[b]ecause the obligation to impanel an impartial jury lies in the first instance with the trial judge, and because he must rely largely on his immediate perceptions, federal judges have been accorded ample discretion in determining how best to
conduct the voir dire." Id. This reasoning also applies to state trial court judges. See,
e.g., Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527 (1973) (recognizing the broad discretion
of state trial judges in determining the form and extent of voir dire questioning).
The voir dire can be conducted in a number of ways. Questions can be posed by the
judge, by counsel, or by both. E.g., NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES § 2.05 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter NATIONAL JURY PROJECT]. Additionally, in order to expedite voir dire proceedings, courts have issued written
questionnaires to jurors as supplements, not substitutes, to voir dire questioning. Id.
§ 2.08. The venirepersons also can be questioned en masse, in small groups, individually,
or in sequestration. Id. § 2.05[3][a], at 2-27 to 2-30. Finally, the extent, form, and content of questions can vary considerably. Id. § 2.05[3][c][iii], at 2-33 to 3-35.
13. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961) (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 156 (1878)).
14. For example, in a capital murder case, if requested by the defendant, the court is
required to determine the jurors' attitudes toward applying the death penalty. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). A juror is not qualified to serve on a capital sentence
proceeding if it is determined during voir dire that his beliefs would "'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions
and his oath.'" Id. at 420 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)).
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substantial likelihood of racial or ethnic prejudice exists." In this
context, the Court held that a substantial likelihood of racial prejudice exists only when racial issues are inextricably intertwined with
the conduct of the trial.' 6 Therefore, to constitutionally require
questions concerning racial bias, there must be a pressing racial
issue and not simply a defendant of a different race than the victim.
15. Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 190 ("Only when there are more substantial indications of the likelihood of racial or ethnic prejudice affecting the jurors in a particular case
does the trial court's denial of the defendant's request to examine the jurors' ability to
deal impartially with this subject amount to an unconstitutional abuse of discretion.").
16. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597 (1976). In Ristaino, a black defendant was
convicted in a Massachusetts court for violent crimes against a white security guard. Id.
at 589-90. The issue presented to the Court was whether the defendant was denied his
constitutional right to a trial by an impartial jury due to the trial court's failure to question the venirepanel regarding possible racial bias. Id. at 590. The Ristaino Court held
that "the mere fact that the victim of the crimes alleged was a white man and the defendants were Negroes" did not "suggest a significant likelihood that racial prejudice might
infect Ross' trial." Id. at 597-98.
In contrast, in Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973), the Court found a constitutional violation when a state trial court refused to question prospective jurors regarding
racial bias. In Ham, the defendant, a black man who was well known locally for his civil
rights activities, was convicted for possession of marihuana. Id. at 524, 525. His defense
at trial was that law enforcement officials were "out to get him" because of his civil rights
affiliations. Id. at 525. The Court held that "the essential fairness required by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that... [the record demonstrate
that] the petitioner [was] permitted to have the jurors interrogated on the issue of racial
bias." Id. at 527. Although the Court's holding required questioning about racial bias, it
neither limited the trial judge's broad discretion in conducting voir dire nor mandated
content questions: "[T]he trial judge [is] not required to put the question in any particular form, or ask any particular number of questions on the subject [of racial bias], simply
because requested to do so by the petitioner." Id.
However, in Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 314 (1931), the Court held that it
was a denial of due process not to inquire into the venirepanel's potential racial bias when
the defendant was black and the victim was white. The Court based the holding on its
supervisory power over the lower federal courts. Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310,
313 (1959). Thus, under Aldridge, the federal courts are required to inquire into racial
prejudice in instances when state courts are not so required. See Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 598
n. 10 (distinguishing the Aldridge and Ham decisions).
Aldridge has been relied on for the proposition that the need for questioning racial bias
has "constitutional stature" in certain instances. See, e.g., Ham, 409 U.S. at 528. Indeed,
the language of Aldridge strongly suggests that when a defendant is black and a victim is
white, questions regarding racial bias are an essential demand of fairness. For example,
the Court stated:
The practice of permitting questions as to racial prejudice is not confined to any
section of the country, and this fact attests the widespread sentiment that fairness demands that such inquiries be allowed....
...We think that it would be far more injurious to permit it to be thought
that persons entertaining a disqualifying prejudice were allowed to serve as jurors and that inquiries designed to elicit the fact of disqualification were barred.
No surer way could be devised to bring the processes of justice into disrepute.
Aldridge, 283 U.S. at 313 n.2, 315.
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Even when such additional issues exist, however, the trial court
need only inquire into the subject of racial7 bias and need not ask
any specific amount or type of questions.'
C. PretrialPublicity
Before Mu'Mn, the Supreme Court had never considered the
proper scope of voir dire in cases plagued by pretrial publicity. It
had, however, recognized the prejudicial effects of pretrial publicity on the jury.' The basic principle that emerged from the
Court's prior pretrial publicity cases was that a juror's self-assessment of impartiality was not always credible. 19 When pretrial publicity reached a significant level, a presumption was raised that
jurors could be tainted by prejudicial publicity.20 The focus of the
Court's early pretrial publicity cases, therefore, was the extent and
content of the media exposure.2 '
For example, in Irvin v. Dowd,2 2 the defendant was convicted of
committing six murders in a rural area of Indiana. The crimes
generated substantial media coverage.2" The issue before the Court
was whether the defendant received a fair trial by an impartial
jury. 24 To resolve the issue, the Court examined the nature and
extent of the pretrial publicity as well as the voir dire record of the
trial court. 25 The Court found that the publicity was continuous,
17. Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 190; Ham, 409 U.S. at 527.
18. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1027-28 (1984); Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 541 (1976); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 795 (1975); Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 335 (1966); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963);
Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 542 (1962); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 719-20
(1961); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 311 (1959).
19. See Irvin, 366 U.S. at 728.
20. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1965) ("[N]evertheless, at times a
procedure employed by the state involves such a probability that prejudice will result that
it is deemed inherently lacking in due process.").
21. Id. at 543-44.
22. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
23. Id. at 725-26. The exhibits presented by the defense counsel revealed a "barrage
of newspaper headlines, articles, cartoons, and pictures unleashed against [the defendant]
during the six or seven months preceding his trial." Id. at 725. Not only were the newspapers in which these stories appeared delivered to 95% of the homes in the county in
which the case was tried, but television and radio stations also "blanketed" the county
with the same stories. Id. The news stories clearly were prejudicial to the defendant
because they referred to his prior criminal background as a juvenile, to his previous convictions for arson and burglary, and to his court martial from the military. Id. The
newspapers also reported his confession to the six murders and to 24 burglaries. Id. at
725-26. One story even characterized the defendant as "remorseless and without conscience" and noted that he had been found sane by court-appointed doctors. Id. at 726.
24. Id. at 719-20.
25. Id. at 725-27.
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"adverse," and "fostered a strong prejudice among the people."'2 6
The voir dire record also revealed that eight of the twelve jurors
who heard the case had decided that the defendant was guilty
before the trial began. 2 7 Nonetheless, the trial judge accepted as
conclusive the jurors' statements that they would be able to render
an impartial verdict.28
The Supreme Court held that in light of the substantial publicity, the trial court's determination of juror impartiality was erroneous. 29 The basic rule of Irvin, then, is that when a case has
generated substantial pretrial publicity, a trial court should not
necessarily accept a juror's assertion of impartiality.3 ° Instead,
when jurors have been exposed to pretrial publicity that is extreme
in both content and volume, a presumption is raised that the jurors
are biased.3
Obviously, every case that receives media attention will not result in a biased jury. There are a number of factors courts consider
when examining the prejudicial effect of pretrial publicity. First,
the coverage must have been extensive because the greater the volume of media coverage, the greater the likelihood that the jurors
were exposed to pretrial information.3 2 Second, the coverage must
26. Id. at 726.
27. Id. at 727. The voir dire record revealed that of the entire venirepanel of 430
persons, the court excused 268 on challenges for cause for having fixed opinions as to the
guilt of the defendant. Id. The defense counsel used 20 peremptory challenges, the maximum allowed under state law. Id. The record also revealed that of the entire panel,
"90% of those examined on the point entertained some opinion as to guilt-ranging in
intensity from mere suspicion to absolute certainty." Id. The Irvin Court concluded that
"[w]ith such an opinion permeating their minds, it would be difficult to say that each
could exclude this preconception of guilt from his deliberations. The influence that lurks
in an opinion once formed is so persistent that it unconsciously fights detachment from
the mental processes of the average man." Id.
28. Id. at 724.
29. Id. at 728-29. The Court quoted Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878),
for the proper standard in reversing a trial court's determination of juror impartiality:
[T]he test is "whether the nature and strength of the opinion formed are such as
in law necessarily ...raise the presumption of partiality.... The affirmative of
the issue is upon the challenger. Unless he shows the actual existence of such
an opinion in the mind of the juror as will raise the presumption of partiality,
the juror need not necessarily be set aside.... If a positive and decided opinion
had been formed, he would have been incompetent even though it had not been
expressed."
Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 156-57).
30. Id. at 728.
31. See id. at 725 (stating that, in light of the highly extensive publicity within the
community, the "build up of prejudice" was "clear and convincing").
32. See Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962) (finding that the pretrial publicity
was not so extensive or intensive as to compel a finding of juror bias); see also United
States v. Kimberlin, 805 F.2d 210, 224 (7th Cir. 1986) (refusing to order a mistrial due to
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have been close in time to the actual trial.33 Finally, courts must
examine the nature and content of the news reports. Reports
clearly slanted against the defendant or containing information not
admissible at trial have a greater potential for prejudicing jurors.3 4
In addition to examining the nature of the actual publicity, trial
courts must determine the extent to which pretrial publicity has
influenced prospective jurors. The sole means of accomplishing
this is through the voir dire. A presumption that the entire
venirepanel is biased exists when the voir dire reveals that a significant number of venirepersons formed an opinion about the defendant's guilt. 31 In such a situation, the jurors' statements that they
pretrial publicity because the record did not reveal a" 'wave of public passion that would
have made a fair trial unlikely' " (quoting Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1032-33
(1984))).
33. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1032 (1984). The Patton Court declined to
find that the defendant was denied a fair trial by an impartial jury despite a finding of
extensive and adverse pretrial publicity. Id. at 1040. The Court held that because the
jury selection did not occur until four years after media coverage had peaked, the effect of
the coverage had diminished and "community sentiment had softened." Id. at 1032.
Therefore, the trial court's finding of jury impartiality was not manifest error. Id.; see
also Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 802 (1975) (finding the fact that most news articles
appeared over a fourteen month period ending seven months before the trial court selected a jury to be dispositive of the issue of jury bias).
34. News items that are purely factual in nature are not prejudicial; however, when
news reports are inflammatory, vicious, and emotionally charged, potential prejudice is
brought into issue. See, e.g., Beck, 369 U.S. at 556 (finding that "the occasional frontpage items were straight news stories rather than invidious articles which would tend to
arouse ill-will and vindictiveness").
Other forms of prejudicial news items include statements made by public officials, confessions of the defendant, and reports containing information that would be inadmissible
at trial. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963) (holding that a news report of
defendant's confession was too prejudicial); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310
(1959) (granting a new trial after finding that the jurors' exposure to information regarding the defendant's prior conviction was prejudicial to the defendant); see also People v.
Gacy, 468 N.E.2d. 1171, 1185-87 (Ill. 1984) (discussing the factors to be taken into account when analyzing the prejudicial effect of certain media coverage). See generally
NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, supra note 12, § 7.04[l][a]-[h], at 7-21 to 7-27 (discussing
types of publicity that have been held to be highly prejudicial); Norbert L. Kerr, On the
Effectiveness of Voir Dire in Criminal Cases with PrejudicialPretrialPublicity: An Empirical Study, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 665, 695 (1991) (finding that information concerning the
defendant's prior record, the existence of incriminating physical evidence, and the defendant's implication in another crime biased mock juries); John S. Carroll et al., Free
Press and Free Trial: The Role of Behavioral Research, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 187,
193 (1986) (citing a number of empirical studies indicating that jurors' exposure to reports of confessions, prior criminal record, and failed lie detector test increased guilty
verdicts).
35. Murphy, 421 U.S. at 803. The Murphy court stated:
In a community where most veniremen will admit to a disqualifying prejudice,
the reliability of the others' protestations may be drawn into question; for it is
then more probable that they are part of a community deeply hostile to the
accused, and more likely that they may unwittingly have been influenced by it.
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can remain impartial are not credible.16 Unless such a presumption of partiality is raised, 7 a court will accept as proof of impartiality a juror's statement that he or she will decide the case based
solely on the evidence presented at trial.3 s
The issue before the Court in Mu'Min v. Virginia was whether
Id.
36. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). In Sheppard, 74 of 75 venirepersons admitted to hearing about the case. Id. at 345. In light of both this and the inflammatory and excessive nature of the publicity, the Court refused to accept the jurors'
statements that they would not be influenced by what they had read, seen, or heard. Id.
at 354 n.9, 355-56; see also Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961) (finding that when
two-thirds of the venirepersons admitted to having an opinion concerning the defendant's
guilt, the jurors' statements of impartiality were not credible). In Irvin, the Court stated:
No doubt each juror was sincere when he said that he would be fair and impartial to the petitioner, but the psychological impact requiring such a declaration
before one's fellows is often its father. Where so many, so many times, admitted
prejudice, such a statement of impartiality can be given little weight.
Id.
37. This presumption of partiality, as raised in Sheppard and Irvin, applied to the
entire venirepanel and was due to unprecedented pretrial publicity. See, e.g., Sheppard,
384 U.S. at 356 ("Indeed, every court that has considered this case, save the court that
tried it, has deplored the manner in which the news media inflamed and prejudiced the
public."); Irvin, 366 U.S. at 726 ("It cannot be gainsaid that the force of this continued
adverse publicity caused a sustained excitement and fostered a strong prejudice .... ).
In a case evincing such widespread public hostility, a fair trial in the community where
the crime occurred will be impossible and a change of venue or continuance likely will be
granted. See, e.g., Irvin, 366 U.S. at 721 (requiring a court to consider the totality of
circumstances in considering jury impartiality before granting a venue change). When
there is substantial pretrial publicity unaccompanied by deep-rooted community outrage,
a presumption of partiality should not be raised as to the entire venirepanel. See, e.g.,
Murphy, 421 U.S. at 802, 803 (failing to find a "community with sentiment so poisoned"
as to require impeachment of all the jurors). However, a presumption of partiality might
be raised as to individual jurors who were exposed to highly inflammatory and prejudicial
information. See, e.g., Patton, 467 U.S. at 1039-40 (holding that mere ambiguity in the
testimony of jurors challenged for cause was not enough to overcome a presumption of
the trial court's correctness). Of course, determining which jurors were exposed to such
prejudicial information will require more than superficial inquiry into pretrial publicity
during voir dire. Id. at 1038 (stating that the identification of biased veniremen is determined through extended voir dire proceedings).
38. See Murphy, 421 U.S. at 803, in which the court excused 20 of 78 venirepersons
because they expressed an opinion as to the defendant's guilt. The Murphy Court declined to find this sufficient to raise a presumption of partiality: "This may indeed be 20
more than would occur in a trial of a totally obscure person, but it by no means suggests a
community with sentiment so poisoned against petitioner as to impeach the indifference
of jurors who displayed no animus of their own." Id.; see also Beck v. Washington, 369
U.S. 541, 556-57 (1962) (only 8 of 52 venirepersons admitted to having formed an opinion regarding petitioner's guilt). Although almost all of the actual jurors in Beck were
exposed to some pretrial publicity, they all professed during voir dire that they had not
formed an opinion and that they "would enter the trial with an open mind disregarding
anything [they] had read on the case." Id. at 555. The Court did not find that the nature
of the pretrial publicity or the examination of the voir dire record compelled it "not to
believe the answers of the jurors." Id.
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due process requires a trial court to ask potential jurors what they
know about the case as a result of the publicity, even though the
jurors assure the trial court that they can remain impartial. The
United States Supreme Court held that due process does not require such an inquiry.
III.
A.

DISCUSSION

The Facts of Mu'Min

In 1973, David Majid Mu'Min was convicted of first-degree
murder in Virginia and sentenced to prison for forty-eight years.39
Mu'Min was therefore incarcerated in a Virgina prison and, on the
morning of September 22, 1988, he and five other inmates were
assigned to a work detail in Prince William County, supervised by
an employee of the Virginia Department of Transportation.4 During his lunch break, Mu'Min crossed a perimeter fence and walked
about a mile to a shopping center where he entered a retail carpet
store.4 ' Using a sharp instrument he had made that morning,
Mu'Min murdered and robbed Mrs. Gladys Nopwasky, the proprietor of the store.4 2 Mu'Min then returned to his work detail after
discarding his weapon and his bloody clothes.43
The murder of a local citizen by a member of a prison work crew
generated a substantial amount of publicity in Prince William
County." Mu'Min's motions for change of venue and individual
39. Mu'Min v. Commonwealth, 389 S.E.2d 886, 889 (Va. 1990).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 890.
42. Id. According to Mu'Min's testimony at trial, a heated argument between himself and Mrs. Nopwasky ensued over the prices of oriental carpets. Id. After Mrs.
Nopwasky called Mu'Min a "nigger" and "spit in [his] face," Mu'Min slapped her, and
then she kicked him in the groin. Id. Mu'Min alleged that as he fell, he "caught the top
part of her pants" and pulled them down. Id. Mrs. Nopwasky then began to slash at him
with a steak knife. Id. Mu'Min next went for his weapon and hit her in the chest and
neck and she started to bleed profusely. Id. Searching for a first aid kit, Mu'Min alleged
that he found four dollars in change which he took to buy ice to apply to the victim's
wounds. Id. He changed his mind, however, and returned only to wipe up his fingerprints. Id.
43. Id.
44. "Surprise, outrage, and fear" were expressed "for the safety of local residents
upon discovery that prisoners like Mu'Min, who had been convicted of violent crimes,
were permitted to work En such close contact with the public." Id. at 899 (Whiting, J.,
dissenting). Thus, a great deal of the media coverage focussed on the gross negligence of
the officials in charge of the prison work detail. Mu'Min v. Virginia, I 11 S. Ct. 1899,
1910 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The details of Mu'Min's crime and his prior criminal record and behavior, however, also attracted media attention. The content of these
stories contained highly prejudicial information:
Readers of local papers learned that Nopwasky had been discovered in a pool of
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voir dire, however, were denied by the trial judge.45 Although eight
of the twelve jurors admitted to reading or hearing about the case,
the trial judge accepted as conclusive the fact that none admitted
to any bias.46 In a bifurcated trial, the jury found Mu'Min guilty of
blood, with her clothes pulled off and semen on her body.... That Mu'Min had
confessed to the crime.... Mu'Min initially offered the incredible claim that he
had entered the store only to help Nopwasky after witnessing another man attempting to rape her.... Another story reported that Mu'Min had admitted to
at least having contemplated raping Nopwasky .... One front page story set
forth the details of Mu'Min's 1973 murder of a cab driver ....[Another stated
that] Mu'Min had been cited for 23 violations of prison rules ....Several stories
reported that Mu'Min had strayed from the.., work detail to go on numerous
criminal forays before murdering Nopwasky. . . . [R]eaders learned that the
murder of Nopwasky could have been avoided if the state had been permitted to
seek the death penalty in Mu'Min's 1973 murder case.
Id. at 1911 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Mu'Min's crime also generated a number of front
page headlines:
MURDERER CONFESSES TO KILLING WOMAN ... INMATE SAID
TO ADMIT TO KILLING... ACCUSED KILLER SAYS HE STABBED
DALE CITY WOMAN AFTER ARGUMENT... MU'MIN SAYS HE DECIDED AGAINST RAPING NOPWASKY... LAXITY WAS FACTOR IN
SEX KILLING.
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Also, a number of stories appeared quoting the opinions of
local officials on the subject:
As quoted in a local paper, a Department of Corrections report acknowledged
that Mu'Min "could not be described as a model prisoner."... The local Congressman announced that he was "deeply distressed by news that my constituent.., was murdered by a convicted murderer serving in a highway department
work program.".. . His opponent in the 1988 congressional election, a member
of the Virginia House of Delegates, likewise wrote an editorial in which he
stated, "I am outraged that a Department of Corrections inmate apparently
murdered a resident of Dale City."
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). The local police chief also assured the public that the right
person had been charged with the crime. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 1902 & n.2. The trial court did not allow the following questions requested
by the defense counsel:
What have you seen, read or heard about this case?
From whom or what did you get this information?
When and where did you get this information?
What did you discuss?
Has anyone expressed an opinion about this case to you?
Who? What? When? Where?
Id. at 1902 n.2.
46. Id. at 1903. The venirepanel consisted of 26 persons. Id. at 1902. Seated in one
group, the panel was asked if anyone previously had heard of the case through the media
or other sources. Id. Sixteen responded affirmatively. Id. The trial court then posed the
following questions:
Would the information that you heard, received, or read from whatever
source, would that information affect your impartiality in this case?
Is there anyone that would say that you've read, seen, heard, or whatever
information you may have acquired from whatever the source would affect your
impartiality so that you could not be impartial?
In view of everything that you've seen, heard, or read, or any information

Mu'Min v. Virginia

1992]

murder and sentenced him to death.47 The Virginia Supreme
Court affirmed the lower court's decision and sentence, with three
Justices dissenting on the basis that the defendant had not been
tried by an impartial jury.48
In a five-to-four opinion, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Virginia Supreme Court. The issue before
the Court was whether prohibiting a criminal defendant from questioning the venirepanel about the specific content of previously acquired information violates due process.49 Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that a defendant is entitled
to question potential jurors who have acquired previous information only as to their ability to remain impartial.5 0
B.

The Majority Opinion

The Court concluded that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that jurors be asked about the
specific content of their exposure to pretrial publicity.5 ' The Court
stated that in order to compel state courts to ask content questions
about pretrial publicity, this compulsion must be constitutionally
mandated. Thus, the proper standard is whether the trial court's
failure to ask such questions rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. 2 The Court conceded that allowing content questions would
help counsel to use peremptory challenges more effectively.1 3 The
Court concluded, however, that simply because the questions
might be "helpful" does not mean they are constitutionally compelled, especially since peremptory challenges are not constitutionally required. 54 In addition, the Court noted that asking content
questions would necessitate interrogation of individual jurors and
found that such a procedure should not be required because it is
from whatever source that you've acquired about this case, is there anyone who
believes that you could not become a Juror, enter the Jury box with an open
mind and wait until the entire case is presented before reaching a fixed opinion
or a conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused?
Id. Only one juror responded in the affirmative to these questions and was dismissed for
cause. Id. The rest remained silent. Id.
47. Mu'Min v. Commonwealth, 389 S.E.2d 886, 889 (Va. 1990), aft'd, II1 S. Ct.
1899 (1991).
48. Id. at 898 (Whiting, J., dissenting, joined by Stephenson and Hassell, JJ.).
49. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1901 (1991).
50. Id. at 1903.
51. Id. at 1908.
52. Id. at 1905.
53. Id.
54. Id. (citing Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988)).

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 23

not constitutionally compelled. 55

In reaching its decision, the Court recognized the absence of a
wide consensus favoring content questions among the state and
lower federal courts. 6 It compared Mu'Min with Aldridge v.
United States 57 in which the Court largely relied on a consensus
among state courts to require the questioning of jurors about racial
prejudice. 58 Additionally, the Court stressed the importance and
tradition of allowing the trial judge wide discretion in conducting
voir dire.5 9

Lastly, the majority examined the extent of the publicity and the
voir dire record of this specific case.' Comparing both to the facts
of Irvin v. Dowd,6 1 the Court concluded that Mu'Min's case did not
create the "wave of public passion" that raises a presumption of
prejudice and that the claims of the jurors as to their impartiality
were credible.6 2 Further, the Court found the voir dire conducted
by the trial court sufficiently thorough in uncovering any bias due
to pretrial publicity.63
C. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
According to Justice O'Connor, the trial judge's assessment of
the jurors' own statements of impartiality did not suffer from manifest error.64 Justice O'Connor stated two reasons why the trial
judge was competent to make this determination despite his failure
to ask content questions. First, the trial judge was aware of all of
the information that the jurors may have been exposed to through
the media.65 Second, the trial judge repeatedly questioned the prospective jurors about their ability to remain impartial despite their
exposure to pretrial publicity. 66 Thus, aware of the full-range of
potentially damaging information, the trial judge was in a position
to determine whether the jurors' own statements of impartiality
were believable. Although Justice O'Connor conceded that asking
content questions might have facilitated a more accurate assess55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id. at 1905-06.
283 U.S. 308 (1931).
Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1905-06; see supra note 16.
Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1906.
Id. at 1907.
366 U.S. 717 (1961); see supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1907.
Id. at 1908.
Id. at 1909 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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ment of the jurors' partiality, she did not think that such questions
were so "indispensable" as to be required by the Sixth
Amendment.67
D. Justice Marshall'sDissent
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, criticized the majority's holding for turning "the Sixth Amendment's
right to an impartial jury ... into a hollow formality." 68 According to Marshall, three reasons exist for asking content questions
when jurors have been exposed to pretrial publicity. First, content
questions are necessary to determine if a juror should be excused
for cause.69 Since a juror exposed to certain types of publicity will
automatically
be disqualified despite any profession of impartiality,7° inquiry into the extent of exposure is necessary. 71 Second, by
asking content questions, the trial court is able to give "legal
depth" and confirmation to a juror's profession of impartiality.72
Third, requiring content questioning compels the trial court to
scrutinize the actual media coverage, facilitating the court's accurate assessment of the jurors' partiality. 73 Since much of the publicity in Mu'Min's case was of the type that would disqualify a
juror as a matter of law,7 4 Justice Marshall concluded that the trial
court could not have assessed the jurors' impartiality without
knowing precisely the information to which they were exposed. 7
Justice Marshall also criticized the majority for interpreting the
Court's racial bias cases to suggest that content questions were not
constitutionally required.76 Marshall stated that the racial bias
cases never mandated content questioning because the issue in
those cases was whether any inquiry into racial bias was required
at all. 77 According to Marshall, the only clear rule from those
cases is that a juror's profession of impartiality is not always believable.78 Justice Marshall noted an earlier Court recognition that the
" 'preservation of the opportunity to prove actual bias is a guaran67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 1909 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1913 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See supra note 27.
Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1913 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1914 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1915 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 34, 44.
Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1915 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1913 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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tee of a defendant's right to an impartial jury.' "" Since the defendant has the burden of proving juror partiality, a thorough
examination of the potential jurors is an essential component of the
right to an impartial jury.80
Finally, Justice Marshall confronted the majority's contention
that content questioning would unduly burden trial courts and interfere with their discretion in conducting voir dire. In support of
the opposite conclusion, Marshall cited authorities from numerous
jurisdictions holding that content questions are necessary to due
process. 8 1 Thus, Justice Marshall concluded that the procedures
used by the trial court in this case were simply routine motions
unlikely to uncover actual juror bias and, therefore,
did not ensure
82
Mu'Min a fair trial with an impartial jury.
E. Justice Kennedy's Dissent
Justice Kennedy concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to ask content questions.8 3 According to Kennedy,
a trial court has a duty to assess each individual juror's ability to be
impartial when the juror has been exposed to pretrial publicity.84
By simply relying on the silence of the prospective jurors as an
indication of their impartiality, the trial court failed to make an
adequate assessment of the jurors' impartiality.85 Although he recognized the deference granted to a trial court's finding of juror impartiality, Justice Kennedy stressed that such deference is based on
the expectation of a voir dire that sufficiently assesses the credibility
of the jurors' assertion of impartiality.8 6
IV.

ANALYSIS

Mu'Min was the Supreme Court's first ruling on the extent and
79. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 17172 (1950)).
80. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 1916 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see, e.g., United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d
190, 196 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that the trial court should have conducted content
questioning); United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 67 (3d Cir. 1971) (finding that voir
dire was appropriately sequestered and devoted to determining the extent and effect of
each prospective juror's exposure to pretrial publicity), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972);
Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 639 (9th Cir. 1968) (stating that the trial
court should have granted a request for content questioning of the venirepanel), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1022 (1971).
82. Mu'Min, 111 S.Ct. at 1917 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 1919 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 1918 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 1919 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 1918-19 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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depth of voir dire required by both the Sixth Amendment and the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. By declining
to include content questions within the guarantees of due process,
the Court's opinion can be criticized for a variety of reasons. First,
the Court placed far too much faith in a juror's judgment of his or
her own impartiality. Second, the Court's comparison of the
Mu'Min facts to Irvin, 7 a case that generated nearly unprecedented publicity, is not dispositive of the issue. Third, the Court
failed to recognize the higher degree of scrutiny that should be employed in a capital murder case. Finally, the Court failed to give
credence to fundamental principles of fairness in judicial procedures as required by the Due Process Clause.
A.

The Inadequacy of a Juror'sSelf-Assessment of Impartiality

According to Mu'Min, due process requires only that voir dire
cover the subject of pretrial publicity. Trial courts, then, can dispose of the issue simply by asking two questions:
(1) Have you read, seen, or heard about this case?
(2) If so, would that affect your ability to remain impartial and
judge the case based only on the evidence presented in
court?
As a result, individual jurors become the judges of their own impartiality, a task that should be performed by the trial court. Making jurors the judges of their own impartiality is misguided for at
least two reasons. First, jurors generally are unaware of their own
prejudices; this is especially true in the area of prejudice due to
pretrial publicity."8 Second, voir dire does not invite an honest disclosure of prejudices.8 9 This is true especially when voir dire is
87. Id. at 1906-07 (contrasting both the number of jurors in each case who had
formed an opinion as to guilt and the types of media coverage prior to each trial).
88.

See JEFFREY T. FREDERICK, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN JURY 27

(1987). Frederick noted:
A study specifically addressing the question of whether jurors recognize their
own biases indicate that jurors are generally unaware of their own prejudices.
Only 26% of those exposed to damaging pretrial publicity recognized their biases, while the remaining supposedly "neutral" jurors who were exposed to
damaging pretrial publicity still convicted the defendant at a 2-to-I rate as compared to jurors not exposed to such publicity.
Id. (citing Stanley Sue et al., Authoritarianism,PretrialPublicity, and Awareness of Bias
in Simulated Jurors, 37 PSYCHOL. REP. 1299 (1975)).
89. "The formal setting of the questioning, often by judges, and the public nature of
the disclosures are among the influences that would attenuate honest responses." Id. at
27. Social science research reveals a variety of factors present during voir dire that affect
juror responses. See NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, supra note 12, § 2.03. For example,
evaluation apprehension, i.e., an awareness of the consequences of one's response, may
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conducted in a group and a juror's silence is considered an indication of his or her impartiality. Thus, relying on a juror's own assessment of impartiality is not a reliable method of ensuring an
impartial jury.'
B.

Overemphasizing the Comparison to Irvin v. Dowd

The Court contrasted the facts of Irvin v. Dowd 91 with Mu'Min
to stress that the pretrial publicity Mu'Min received was not great
enough to create a presumption of prejudice. 92 Although the majority admitted that "the pretrial publicity appear[ed] to be substantial," it concluded that the publicity "was not of the same kind
or extent as that found to exist in Irvin." 93 The Court in Irvin held
that due to the prejudicial effect of pretrial publicity, a change of
venue should have been granted. 94 An examination of the record
in Irvin revealed an extraordinary amount of pretrial publicity and
a marked effect on the venirepanel. 9" The Irvin Court, however,
did not establish that the excessive publicity present in that case
was the threshold amount of publicity for viable claims of juror
partiality. The publicity generated by Mu'Min's crime was substantial as well as inflammatory. 96 Although the facts in Mu'Min
may not have revealed a wave of public passion set against the defendant warranting a presumption of partiality of the entire
venirepanel, a presumption of partiality should have been raised as
to any member of the jury who was exposed to the prejudicial media coverage. 97 By not requiring content questions to be asked and
cause jurors to answer in ways that will have the most favorable results or portray themselves in the most favorable light. Id. § 2.03[1]. Generally, people seek to portray themselves as honest and fair, and thus, in the context of the voir dire, most people will seek to
portray themselves as impartial. Id. § 2.03[2]. The greater the social status of the interviewer, the more the respondent's evaluation apprehension increases. The status difference between a judge and juror, therefore, would substantially increase apprehension. Id.
§ 2.03[3]. The presence of an audience also affects juror candor. Id. § 2.03[4]. The general tendency when responding in front of a large group and in an unfamiliar situation is
to avoid embarrassment by giving minimal responses that conform to responses given by
others. Id.
90. See NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, supra note 12, § 2.05[3][c][ii] (discussing the inadequacy of a juror's self assessment of impartiality); Kerr, supra note 34, at 700-01 (noting that results of an empirical study suggest that jurors' assertions of impartiality or
partiality indicate very little about the actual degree of juror bias).
91. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
92. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1906-07 (1991).
93. Id. at 1907.
94. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 728-29.
95. See supra notes 23, 27.
96. See supra note 44.
97. The majority also ignored the fact that exposure to much of the publicity gener-
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the extent of media exposure to be revealed, the Mu'Min Court
ignored its prior holdings that had recognized the potential prejudicial effects of pretrial publicity.
C. A GreaterLevel of Scrutiny in Capital Cases
Given the stark finality of the death penalty, the Court has recognized that the procedures in capital cases warrant extra scrutiny.9" David Majid Mu'Min was found guilty and sentenced to
death, by a jury in which three-fourths of the jurors possibly were
exposed to extremely prejudicial information. Since the trial court
refused to question the jurors regarding the content of their exposure, no one can be certain how extensively the sensationalized
news reports influenced the jury. The trial court and the United
States Supreme Court both were satisfied that the jurors were capable of honestly determining their own impartiality. Neither court
felt the need to delve any deeper into the matter, even though a
man's life hung in the balance and a few minimal precautions
could have ensured him an impartial jury and a fair trial.
D. FundamentalFairness
The Court in Mu'Min chose judicial economy over fairness. At
its heart, due process guarantees fundamental fairness in judicial
proceedings. 99 The Mu'Min decision undermines this notion of
ated by the case may have necessitated a challenge for cause. See supra notes 18-38.
News reports contained information regarding Mu'Min's prior convictions and his confession, see supra note 44, and both of these are grounds that the Court previously found
warranted a presumption of partiality. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963)
(jurors' exposure to defendant's publicized confession rendered trial fundamentally unfair); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959) (jurors' exposure through news
accounts of defendant's prior convictions warranted new trial).
98. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983) ("The Court... has recognized that the qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination."); Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1961) ("Where one's life is at stake-and accounting for the
frailties of human nature-we can only say that in the light of the circumstances here the
finding of impartiality does not meet constitutional standards." (emphasis added)); Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 314 (1931) ("[W]e do not think that it can be said
that the possibility of such prejudice is so remote as to justify the risk in forbidding the
inquiry. And this risk becomes most grave when the issue is of life or death." (emphasis
added)); see also Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986) (holding that inquiry into
racial prejudice is required in a capital sentencing proceeding when defendant is black
and victim is white due to the grave finality of the death penalty); State v. Williams, 459
A.2d 641, 652 (N.J. 1983) (stating that the "requirement of fairness-and particularly
jury impartiality-is heightened in cases in which the defendant faces death").
99. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 47 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting
that "the principle of due process ... requires fundamental fairness in criminal trials");
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (stating that "our system of law has always
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fairness as well as the integrity of the criminal court system.oo
Rather than supporting procedures that are reasonably reliable in
ascertaining juror bias due to pretrial publicity, the Mu'Mn Court
opted for a procedure that gives only the illusion of uncovering
bias."0 ' Although the entire Court admitted that content questions
would have been helpful in ensuring an impartial jury, 10 2 only three
Justices thought that due process required them. 0 3 The other Justices were more concerned with judicial economy than with guaranteeing the defendant a fair trial.
V.

A.

IMPACT

The General Effect of Mu'Min

The Mu'Mn decision mandates that potential prejudice due to
pretrial publicity be addressed during voir dire; however, Mu'Mn
only requires coverage of the subject in the most perfunctory
way.101 Although Mu'Mn holds that due process does not require

content questions in cases with substantial pretrial publicity, the
endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness"). In the words of Chief Justice
Taft:
Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man
•.. to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which
might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State
and the accused, denies the latter of due process of law.
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927); see also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 543
(1965) (holding that the televising and broadcasting of the petitioner's trial deprived him
of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment).
100. The Court has stated:
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, criminal prosecutions must comport with prevailing notions of fundamental fairness. We
have long interpreted this standard of fairness to require that criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense....
thereby protecting the innocent from erroneous conviction and ensuring the integrity of our criminal justice system.
California v. Trobetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984).
101. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1916 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see
supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
102. Mu'Min, 111 S.Ct. at 1901, 1905, 1909, 1913, 1918-19 (opinions of the majority,
Justice O'Connor, Justice Marshall, and Justice Kennedy, respectively).
103. Id. at 1912 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104. The Court's holding in Mu'Min does not, on its face, overrule any prior pretrial
publicity decisions. In a case such as Irvin, when there is a "wave of passion" and widespread community outrage against the defendant, a presumption should still be raised
that the entire community may be biased. In such a case, the court should grant a change
of venue or a continuance.
There is a danger, however, that the Mu'Min decision undermines Irvin. If a trial
court does not inquire into the extent and content of the prospective jurors' exposure to
publicity, it 'might fail to become aware of a "wave of passion" set against the defendant.
By relying solely on the jurors' self-assessment of impartiality, see supra notes 19-21 and
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decision does not prevent courts from asking more probing questions than those required by due process."10 Thus, state courts are
free either to afford criminal defendants procedures above and beyond the demands of the Constitution or to follow the lax lead of
the Supreme Court of the United States."°
accompanying text, a trial court easily could seat a jury that has already been convinced
by the media of the defendant's guilt.
105. A question not addressed in Mu'Min is whether federal courts must ask contentbased questions in cases involving pretrial publicity. Under its supervisory power over
federal courts, the Supreme Court has sometimes mandated procedures that are beyond
the minimum requirements of due process. One example is the requirement of asking
questions relating to racial bias. See Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308 (1931). The
Aldridge rule, that racial bias questions must be asked whenever the defendant is black
and the victim is white, only applies to federal courts. See id. Under Ristaino v. Ross,
424 U.S. 589, 597 (1976), however, due process only requires that racial bias questions be
asked when race is at issue. See supra note 16.
Of course, because Mu'Min simply delineates the minimum constitutional due process
requirements, the lower federal courts that already require content questions will not be
affected by the Mu'Min decision, since it does not speak to any supervisory power issue.
See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 197-98 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that inadequate voir dire in cases involving substantial pretrial publicity renders the trial court unable to fairly assess the jurors' impartiality); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 374
(7th Cir. 1972) (requiring inquiry into jurors' exposure to pretrial publicity when the
defense brings the issue forward and requests questioning); Silverthorne v. United States,
400 F.2d 627, 638 (9th Cir. 1968) (reversing a conviction due to trial court's failure to
make any effort to ascertain the impact of pretrial publicity on jurors).
106. Nothing prevents state courts from affording greater rights than those guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Federal guarantees are a floor beneath which
state courts cannot fall in recognizing constitutional rights. See, e.g., James R. Acker &
Elizabeth R. Walsh, Challengingthe Death Penalty Under State Constitutions, 42 VAND.
L. REV. 1299, 1313 (1989). As long as state courts explicitly note that their decisions are
based on adequate and independent state grounds, those courts are free to find that state
constitutions offer greater rights than the Federal Constitution. See, e.g., Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037-38 (1983). In reaction to the Burger and Rehnquist Courts'
narrowing of the protections of the Bill of Rights, many state courts have interpreted
their state constitutions to offer greater liberties than those available under the Federal
Constitution. For articles discussing this trend of "state specific" rights, see William J.
Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as
Guardiansof Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986); Ronald K.L. Collins &
Peter J. Galie, Models of Post-IncorporationJudicialReview: 1985 Survey of State Constitutional IndividualRights Decisions, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 317 (198,6); Timothy R. Lohraff,
Note, United States v. Leon and Illinois v. Gate" A Callfor State Courts to Develop State
ConstitutionalLaw, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 311; Recent Developments in the Law-The
Interpretationof State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324 (1982).
The New Jersey Supreme Court has already afforded its capital defendants greater
rights regarding voir dire than those guaranteed by the Federal Constitution under
Mu'Min, maintaining that "voir dire in a capital cause should be open-ended, thorough
and searching, and designed to elicit a potential juror's views, biases, and inclinations."
State v. Erazo, 594 A.2d 232, 240-41 (N.J. 1991) (citations omitted). Basing its decision
on state law precedent, the New Jersey court declined to march lock-step with the
Supreme Court. In a strong concurring opinion in Erazo, Justice Handler stressed the
inadequacy of the United States Supreme Court in insuring the due process rights of
capital defendants: "It cannot, in this context, be overemphasized that the United States
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The Impact of Mu'Min in Illinois

The Illinois Supreme Court has never specifically addressed the
adequacy of voir dire in cases involving pretrial publicity. However, its approach to pretrial publicity in People v. Taylor 07 reveals
a much more liberal stance than the United States Supreme
Court's position in Mu'Min. Although the Illinois court in Taylor
did not expressly hold that content questions are required, it maintained in dicta that these questions may be required:
Once the judge is aware that there has been intensive publicity
which included dissemination of inadmissible and highly prejudicial information, the judge has no choice but to inquire as to the
details which the potential juror remembers. As soon as the juror mentions
these details, that juror is subject to a challenge for
08
cause. 1

In Taylor, the trial court conducted a thorough and searching
voir dire that revealed specific, inadmissible information to which
the jurors had been exposed. 09 If the trial court had failed to ask
the venirepanel these questions, however, the issue of actual prejudice due to knowledge of inadmissible information could not have
been raised. If this had been the case, perhaps the Illinois Supreme
Court would have been confronted with the same issue as that in
Mu'Mn. Based on the language of Taylor, it seems that the Illinois Supreme Court would have decided the issue differently than
the United States Supreme Court. With the decision in Mu'Min,
however, Illinois courts must now decide whether to stay true to
Supreme Court continues to eviscerate the procedural safeguards afforded capital defendants under the federal constitution .... That untoward development only strengthens
the need and responsibility of state judiciaries to assure the sufficiency of protection in
capital causes." Id. at 248 (Handler, J., concurring) (citing Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S.
Ct. 1899 (1991)).
107. 462 N.E.2d 478 (I11.
1984). Taylor dealt with the capital defendant's request for
a change of venue due to pretrial publicity. Id. at 480-81. The voir dire record revealed
that six of the seated jurors heard prior to trial that the defendant failed a lie detector test,
information inadmissible at trial. Id. The court held that exposure to this information
coupled with the unprecedented volume of publicity was enough to raise the presumption
of partiality and, thus, that the jurors' assertions of impartiality were insufficient to rebut
that presumption. Id. at 484.
108. Id. at 486.
109. The record revealed:
Voir dire in this case was conducted largely by the trial judge and lasted three
days. Each prospective juror was asked a series of questions dealing with his
knowledge of the case, including his exposure to and memory of written broadcast reports. When a juror remembered certain key details, that juror was specifically asked if he had formed any opinions or drawn any inferences from
those facts.
Id. at 482-83.
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the fairer standards enunciated in Taylor or instead to give defendants Mu'Mn's bare minimum and inadequate due process
requirements.
Although the Illinois Supreme Court has been criticized for
blindly applying the United States Supreme Court's interpretations
of the Federal Bill of Rights to similar provisions in the Illinois
Constitution," 0 the Illinois Supreme Court in recent years has begun to assert the independence of the Illinois Constitution.' Generally, the Illinois Supreme Court will follow federal constitutional
principles unless the language of the Illinois Constitution or the
records of the Illinois constitutional convention indicate an intention to construe the Illinois Constitution differently. " 2 The Illinois
Supreme Court has noted the differences in language between the
Illinois and the United States constitutional rights to a jury trial. "
110. See Thomas B. McAffee, The IllinoisBill of Rights and Our Independent Legal
Tradition: A Critiqueof the Illinois Lockstep Doctrine, 12 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1 (1987); Roger
Kangas, Note, Interpretingthe Illinois Constitution: Illinois Supreme Court Plays Follow
the Leader, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1271 (1987).
111. See People ex rel Daley v. Joyce, 533 N.E.2d 873, 878 (Ill. 1988) (providing
greater rights involving waiver of jury trial); People v. Duncan, 530 N.E.2d 423, 430 (Ill.
1988) (providing greater rights in jury trial involving right of confrontation); People v.
Gacho, 522 N.E.2d 1146, 1164 (Ill. 1988) (providing greater protection from cruel and
unusual punishments than federal guarantees).
112. See People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147 (Ill. 1984). Other state courts have not
limited the circumstances for diverging from federal constitutional decisions to the same
extent. For example, some state courts have departed from United States Supreme Court
decisions simply on public policy grounds or in reaction to the low levels of protection
provided by the United States Constitution. See, e.g., People v. Disbrow, 545 P.2d 280
(Cal. 1976) (refusing to follow Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)); State v. Rogers,
568 P.2d 199, 204 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977) (refusing to follow Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S.
121 (1959)).
Other state courts, however, only depart from Supreme Court decisions when "statespecific factors" warrant independent state rights. These state-specific factors include:
(1) textual differences between similar provisions of state and federal constitutions;
(2) state statutes that grant rights greater than those offered by the United States Constitution; (3) state case law precedent that supports divergence from federal law;
(4) records from state constitutional conventions that evince an intention to interpret
state constitutional provisions independently from the U.S. Constitution; and (5) decisions from other state courts diverging from federal law. Lohraff, Note, supra note 106,
at 347-48.
113. Joyce, 533 N.E.2d at 875. The Illinois Constitution has two provisions granting
the right to a jury trial. The first provides:
In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right.., to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury.
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8. The second provides:
The right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate.
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
In contrast, the U.S. Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy trial,
by an impartial jury.
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The Illinois Supreme Court has held, therefore, that an independent analysis of the right to jury trial in Illinois is warranted." 4
Since the Illinois Supreme Court has concluded that a separate
analysis of the right to jury trial is justified, Illinois courts have at
least two other independent state grounds or "state-specific"
rights'1 5 on which to require a higher level of protection than that
offered by Mu'Mn. First, Illinois has developed an independent
body of case law dealing with pretrial publicity." 6 As explained
above, People v. Taylor and other Illinois cases evince a much more
liberal attitude toward content questions than Mu'Mn. Second,
criminal defendants in Illinois have a statutory right to peremptory7
challenges and to have prospective jurors challenged for cause."
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

114. Joyce, 533 N.E.2d at 875. The Illinois Supreme Court stated:
[Als to the jury trial issue, there is a difference in the language of our State
constitution from that of the Federal Constitution, and the difference is one of
substance and not merely one of form ....
[W]e should give our State constitutional provision meaning independent of the construction the Federal courts
have placed on the jury trial provisions of the Federal Constitution.
Id. (citations omitted).
115. See supra note 112.
116. See People v. Lucas, 548 N.E.2d 1003, 1011 (Ill. 1989) (holding that the fact
that 19 venire members had been excused for cause due to exposure to pretrial publicity
did not show that defendant had been denied a fair trial by an impartial jury, especially
when no juror seated had indicated specific knowledge of the case or had formed an
opinion); People v. Britz, 528 N.E.2d 703, 714 (Ill. 1988) (finding no bias due to pretrial
publicity when the voir dire record revealed that four jurors who had been exposed to
such publicity only had sketchy recollections of the case); People v. Sanchez, 503 N.E.2d
277, 285-86 (Ill. 1986) (holding that the defendant was not denied a fair trial due to
pretrial publicity when only two of the impaneled jurors had read of the crime and
neither had extensive recollections of details); People v. Taylor, 462 N.E.2d 478, 486-87
(Ill. 1984) ("What we have in this case is the documented fact of the unprecedented
volume of publicity combined with the exposure of impaneled jurors to inadmissible,
highly prejudicial information ....
[T]he trial judge erred by denying the challenges for
cause."); People v. Gendron, 243 N.E.2d 208, 210-13 (Ill. 1968) (finding that the defendant was not denied trial by an impartial jury when trial court excused 123 of 297 prospective jurors due to prejudice arising from pretrial publicity and when thorough voir dire
did not disclose any bias due to pretrial publicity in the jurors seated), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 889 (1969); People v. Kurtz, 224 N.E.2d 817, 820 (Ill. 1967) (finding that "[t]he
examination of prospective jurors on voir dire is, in a typical instance of pretrial publicity,
probably the most valuable means of ascertaining partiality or indifference among persons summoned as jurors"); People v. Hines, 518 N.E.2d 1362, 1365-68 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th
Dist. 1988) (finding no violation of right to impartial jury when pretrial publicity to
which jurors were exposed was largely factual in nature).
117. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-4 (1989). This provision states in pertinent
part:
(d) Each party may challenge jurors for cause.
(e) A defendant tried alone shall be allowed 20 peremptory challenges in a
capital case, 10 in a case in which the punishment may be imprisonment in the
penitentiary, and 5 in all other cases; except that, in a single trial of more than
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By not allowing inquiry into a prospective juror's exposure to potentially prejudicial publicity, the defendant's statutory right to exercise his or her peremptory challenges or to have jurors
challenged for cause is seriously impaired. The peremptory challenge is rendered worthless if the defendant has no means of intelligently assessing when it should be exercised, especially when jurors
should be excused for cause but their exposure to prejudicial information cannot be revealed without adequate voir dire.
In summary, the constitution, statutes, and case law of Illinois
establish independent and adequate grounds for Illinois courts to
adequately guarantee impartial juries beyond what is required by
the Federal Constitution. Thus, when a case receives substantial
publicity, Illinois courts should grant criminal defendants the right
to question potential jurors about their exposure to such pretrial
publicity.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Mu'Min v. Virginia places severe limitations on the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee to an impartial jury. In effect, the decision denies criminal defendants the means to prove that pretrial
publicity tainted jurors. By not requiring inquiry into the extent of
media exposure and by instead placing blind reliance on a juror's
judgment of his or her own impartiality, the Supreme Court has
provided trial courts with an ill-designed method for judging juror
impartiality. The result is obvious: when there has been extensive
pretrial publicity, criminal defendants face the possibility of trial in
front of jurors who prejudged the case before the trial began.
Due to the potentially unfair result that Mu'Min yields, Illinois
and other states should rely on their own state laws to ensure fairness in judicial proceedings. The Supreme Court in MuMin continued down its untoward trail of limiting the procedural
safeguards available to criminal defendants under the Federal Bill
of Rights. When notions of fairness demand a higher level of protection, state courts should neither be led down nor blindly follow
this same trail.
DAVID EDSEY

one defendant, each defendant shall be allowed 12 peremptory challenges in a
capital case, 6 in a case in which the punishment may be imprisonment in the
penitentiary, and 3 in all other cases.
Id. para. 115-4(d), (e).

